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Abstract
Through constructing a New-Keynesian DSGE model with heterogeneous agents, this paper
investigates both the aggregate and distributional consequences of fiscal policy. Polarized preferences
over the conduct of fiscal policy emerge between those agents who participate in credit markets and
those who do not. Exogenous shocks impact the two types of agent differently, and, as a result, fiscal
policy responses to these shocks produce minimal aggregate welfare effects as the gains of one agent
are matched by the losses of another. There is, therefore, a normative justification for countercyclical
fiscal policy, but on redistributive rather than stabilisation grounds.
JEL Classification: E30; E62; H30.
1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global economic downturn brought fiscal policy back onto the
political and academic agenda. Across developed economies, governments looked to large fiscal stimuli
in order to counteract the effects of recession and boost demand. Despite this return to fiscal policy,
there is still much debate as to whether such measures have the desired effects, most recently seen in
the ‘austerity versus stimulus’ debate. These discussions tend to focus on the aggregate impact of policy
(the fiscal multiplier) in models which assume a representative agent; this paper seeks to contribute to
this literature by focusing on both the positive and normative consequences of policy and, moreover, to
consider these within a model which includes heterogeneous households. It does this through constructing
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which includes a proportion of agents who do
not participate in capital markets.
Our results suggest that preferences over the conduct of fiscal policy are polarized and that there is
a normative justification for countercyclical policy. This justification comes from redistributive concerns
where there are only modest improvements in average welfare from policy. Those agents who do not
participate in capital markets are the most exposed to business cycles and therefore gain from policy
which promotes stability. In the absence of borrowing during downturns, these agents increase their
labour supply in order to supplement their income, which suppresses wages and subsequently transfers
welfare from workers to capital holders. Capital holders gain from such activity, and therefore gain from
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policies which promote rather than remove volatility in the business cycle: for these agents, the actions
of the credit-constrained are more insulating than any governmental activity. As workers gain from
countercyclical policy, capital holders lose in a near zero sum game, which suggests that preferences are
highly polarized over the conduct of fiscal measures.
The intuition behind these results is in line with the literature discussing Lucas’ (2003) claim that
the welfare impact of business cycles are negligible; through analysing cyclical movements in aggregate
US consumption, the welfare gain of removing economic fluctuations was calculated to be the utility
equivalent of less than one-tenth a percentage point increase in average consumption. Theoretical re-
search addressing this suggests that there is heterogeneity across households in this estimate which the
aggregation hides. Krusell and Smith (1999), Krusell et al. (2009) and Mukoyama and S¸ahin (2006)
conclude that the poor, unskilled and unemployed are the most exposed to welfare losses from economic
fluctuations: those agents who typically do not engage in capital markets. Carroll (2000) further suggests
that the distribution of wealth is an important determinant in agents’ experiences from macroeconomic
phenomena, a point also emphasised by Mankiw (2000) when discussing the aggregate effects of fiscal
policy. This heterogeneity may also support the result that when using subjective measures of welfare,
the implied costs of business cycles are larger than those originally suggested by Lucas: see for example
Wolfers (2003). The contribution of this paper is to discuss the effects of fiscal policy across hetero-
geneous agents using a New-Keynesian DSGE model, which are the main models used to analyse the
theoretical aggregate impacts of policy (see for example Gal´ı et al., 2007). Through combining these
two literatures, not only can the model predict aggregate dynamics under different policies, it can also
predict political barriers and motives to these policies.
Our results suggest that preferences over fiscal conduct are polarized, where credit-constrained agents
benefit from countercyclical fiscal policy and the unconstrained do not; moreover, the returns to those
who do participate in capital markets from procyclical policy are higher the smaller their proportion is,
contributing to the literature which finds fiscal policy to be frequently procyclical, especially in developing
countries: see for example Woo (2009). These economies are seen to have both higher degrees of asset
market non-participation (increasing the returns of procyclical policy for the unconstrained: see for
example Evans and Karras, 1996) and lower rates of voter turnout (which is particularly prevalent in
those with less income: see for example Nevitte et al., 2009). Providing that sufficient voting power
is retained by capital holders, this suggests that the prevalence of fiscal procyclicality is a political
issue, rather than a financial one. The inclusion of distortionary taxes into the analysis provides further
potential for polarizing preferences, as these taxes are by their nature redistributive. The results are
also amplified when monetary policy is at its zero lower bound, a common feature of the recent global
recession.
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The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 builds a model which includes a proportion of
agents who do not participate in capital markets. Section 3 discusses both the positive and normative
consequences of fiscal policy across households through deriving algebraic properties of a benchmark
model, through dynamic simulation from specific policy episodes, and through considering the cyclical
properties of policy over the business cycle. Section 4 considers further extensions and sensitivity, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model presented below is a cashless DSGE model with sticky prices, including six types of economic
agents: a continuum of households split into two heterogeneous groups; a continuum of monopolistically
competitive firms producing intermediate goods and a perfectly competitive sector producing the final
good; and a monetary and fiscal authority. The model is similar to Gal´ı et al. (2007), the seminal paper
in the rule-of-thumb DSGE literature, and differs by introducing non-policy shocks such that fiscal policy
is responding to the business cycle, as opposed to causing it.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum [0, 1] of infinitely lived households, all of whom consume the final good and supply
labour to firms. A proportion of these households (1− λ) are patient, who trade in a full set of state
contingent securities, own company shares, and own the capital stock of the economy. The remaining
proportion (λ) are impatient to such a degree that they neither save nor invest in capital or company
shares. The following period utility function is assumed for both types of household:
U it = ε
b
t
((
Cit
)1−σ
1− σ
−
(
N it
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
(1)
where Ct and Nt are the amount of consumption and employment consumed and supplied respectively
in period t, and εbt represents an exogenous shock to the discount rate which affects intertemporal
substitution preferences of households. The parameter σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and
ϕ is the inverse elasticity of work with respect to real wages. Superscript i differentiates these variables
between patient (i = R) and impatient (i = NR) households who are assumed to supply labour in a
perfectly competitive market with no frictions or time delays; sensitivity of the results to this labour
market assumption is performed.1
1Superscript ‘R’ and ‘NR’ follows Gal´ı et al. (2007) and represents ‘Ricardian’ and ‘non-Ricardian’ respectively, de-
scribing the agent’s reaction to movements in lump sum taxes.
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2.1.1 Patient households
Patient households earn income from their labour supply (at wage rate Wt), from dividends paid on
share ownership, DRt , from maturing one period bonds purchased in the previous period, B
R
t , and from
the return on their capital stock KRt (at rental rate R
k
t ). They use this income to reinvest in the bond
market (with return Rt), purchase the consumption good (at price Pt), reinvest in capital, I
R
t , and pay
lump sum taxes levied by the government, TRt . This leaves a budget constraint for patient households
given by:
Pt
(
CRt + I
R
t
)
+
BRt+1
Rt
≤ BRt +R
k
tK
R
t +WtN
R
t − PtT
R
t +D
R
t (2)
where capital evolves according to:
KRt+1 =
[
(1− δ)KRt +
(
1− S
(
εitI
R
t
IRt−1
))
IRt
]
εkt+1 (3)
where the rate of depreciation is given by δ, a capital adjustment cost function is imposed, S (·), which
satisfies S (0) = 0, S′(0) = 0 and S′′ (·) > 0, and εit and ε
k
t+1 represents exogenous shocks to the
investment cost function and capital quality respectively.2 Patient households maximize expected lifetime
utility (given by the sum of (1) from t = 0 to t = ∞) with a discount factor βR ∈ (0, 1), subject to the
budget constraint (2) and capital flow constraint (3), with respect to consumption, employment, capital
and bond purchases, where all prices are taken as given.
2.1.2 Impatient households
Impatient households are assumed to discount future time periods to such a degree that they do not
save from current income, nor do they invest in either capital or dividends. An exogenous borrowing
constraint of zero is imposed on these agents, who therefore simply consume their period disposable
income generated through their labour supply:
PtC
NR
t =WtN
NR
t − PtT
NR
t (4)
Impatient households optimize by making decisions on how much labour to supply at a given wage rate:
maximisation of (1) subject to the budget constraint (4).
2.2 Production
The final good is produced in a perfectly competitive sector using the following technology:
2For dynamic simulation we set S (It/It−1) = κ/2 (It/It−1 − 1), where κ represents a capital adjustment cost parameter.
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Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt (j)
ǫ−1
ǫ dj
) ǫ
ǫ−1
where Yt represents the final good sold at price Pt, Yt (j) represents the quantity of the intermediate good
produced by firm j sold at price Pt (j), and ǫ represents the elasticity of substitution across intermediate
goods. Profit maximisation of the final good firm, taking all prices as given, yields the following standard
demand schedules:
Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt ∀ j ∈ [0, 1] (5)
A continuum of firms indexed j ∈ [0, 1] are assumed to produce the differentiated intermediate goods,
Yt (j), subject to Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt (j) = ε
a
tKt (j)
α
Nt (j)
1−α
(6)
where Kt (j) and Nt (j) are the level of capital and labour employed by firm j respectively, and ε
a
t
represents a total factor productivity shock whose logarithm is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
with stochastic volatility.3 A Calvo (1983) pricing structure is assumed for intermediate goods, where
firms in any period get the opportunity to reset prices with probability (1 − θ). This probability is
fixed, exogenous, and independent of when the firm was last randomly selected to reset their price. The
remaining suppliers, θ, must maintain the same price as they had in period t− 1.
2.3 Monetary authority
A standard Taylor rule is applied for the conduct of monetary policy where the nominal interest rate
responds to both deviations in inflation and the output gap:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR ((Πt
Π
)ϕπ
Y˜t
ϕy
)1−ρR
ηrt (7)
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 represents inflation, variables with no time subscript represent steady state values,
and where ηrt and ρR represent, respectively, an exogenous shock to and persistence in nominal interest
rates. The output gap, Y˜t, represents deviations of output away from its potential defined as the level of
output that would prevail under flexible prices.
3Specifically, it is assumed log (εat ) = ρa log
(
εat−1
)
+σat η
a
t where η
a
t ∼ N(0, 1) and where log (σ
a
t ) = (1− ρσa ) log(σ
a)+
ρσa log
(
σat−1
)
+ ησat .
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2.4 Fiscal authority
The fiscal authority purchases a proportion of the final goods for public consumption, Gt, raises lump
sum taxation from the two households, TRt and T
NR
t , and issues nominal risk-free one-period bonds,
Bt+1. As such, the flow constraint of the government is given by:
PtGt +Bt ≤ Pt(T
R
t + T
NR
t ) +
Bt+1
Rt
(8)
The model includes a proportion of impatient households and therefore the dynamics of government
expenditures, taxes and debt are relevant. Feedback rules are applied whereby the government responds
to the business cycle and the level of debt:
Gt
G
= Y˜t
ϕg
(
Bˆt
Bˆ
)ϕb,g
,
Tt
T
= Y˜t
ϕT
(
Bˆt
Bˆ
)ϕb,T
(9)
where Bˆt = Bt/Yt and it is assumed that T
NR
t /T
NR = TRt /T
R = Tt/T ; changes in lump sum taxation are
equal across households and there is no redistribution between households through changes in taxation.4
Setting either ϕg < 0 or ϕT > 0 represents countercyclical fiscal policy, and ϕb,g < 0, ϕb,T > 0 ensures
to preserve the solvency constraint.5
This paper reflects upon normative consequences of fiscal policy which are sensitive to the assumed
presence, or not, of government spending in the utility function. We propose to bypass this issue by
only focusing on those policy actions which lead to a negligible net movement in discounted government
spending over the lifetime of the policy: this has the advantage that any conclusions reached are not
sensitive to this empirically questionable issue. This process leaves two policy experiments upon which
to focus the analysis. The first (referred to as ‘policy experiment 1’) is where short term government
spending rises are repaid in the longer term through future spending cuts. Interest accrues on debt in
steady state at a rate of (βR)−t, whereas if government spending were to enter the utility function (1)
separably, individuals would discount future changes in this spending at a rate of (βi)t: this experiment
therefore results in a negligible discounted government spending movement.6 The second (referred to as
‘policy experiment 2’) is where short term tax cuts are repaid in the longer term through tax rises.
4In the absence of distinguishing characteristics between the two agents beyond impatience, this assumption seems
reasonable: sensitivity of the results to non-lump sum taxation is performed.
5The government is also assumed to satisfy the constraint that in the long run all debts are repaid (limt→∞Bt+1/Rt =
0).
6Although the difference in assumed discount rates of the patient and impatient households will generate differences in
net discounted government spending, these will be small over the lifetime of the fiscal experiment.
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2.5 Market clearing
In equilibrium, aggregate consumption and employment are equal to the weighted average of the two
variables across households:
Ct = (1− λ)C
R
t + λC
NR
t , Nt = (1− λ)N
R
t + λN
NR
t (10)
Moreover, all output must be invested or consumed by either the government or private individuals:
Yt = Ct +Gt + It (11)
Logarithms of shocks to preferences, εbt , the investment cost function, ε
i
t, capital quality, ε
k
t+1, the
production function, εat , and variations in the volatility of productivity, σ
a
t , are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes with persistence given by ρi and standard deviations σ
i where i = {a, b, i, k, σa}.
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3 The impact of fiscal policy on the aggregate and disaggregate
economy
This section discusses the conduct of fiscal policy and the heterogeneous impact it has across agents.
It first does this through deriving algebraic conditions on a simplified version of the model in order to
provide intuition on the aggregate effect of policy, independent of parameter calibration. Simulations
are then performed focusing on the impact of fiscal policy during a period of a negative output gap; this
is to obtain a full understanding of the transmission mechanisms involved, and to consider the recent
economic environment. The section subsequently analyses the conduct of policy over the business cycle,
to obtain more general results.
3.1 A benchmark model
If the model above abstracts from capital formation and is approximated using log-linear transformations,
the resulting system can be condensed into an aggregate demand condition, a New-Keynesian Phillips
curve, and monetary and fiscal rules. The benefit of this is that algebraic conditions (independent of
parameter calibrations) can be derived, illustrating the impact of fiscal policy on the aggregate economy.
From such a model it is possible to show that, providing λ < λ∗ (for some constant λ∗, defined in the
appendix):8
7The non-stochastic steady state of the model is solved, and the perturbation method in Dynare is used to apply a
third-order approximation of the model. The stochastic simulations are also computed using Dynare.
8At high proportions of impatient households, λ, the dynamics and determinacy of the model are reversed as reflected
upon in Bilbiie (2008): the critical value being notated in Bilbiie as λ∗. When λ > λ∗ tax rises, interest rate rises and
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∂yt
∂ĝt
> 0,
∂yt
∂t̂t
< 0,
∣∣∣∣∂yt∂ĝt
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂yt∂t̂t
∣∣∣∣ (12)
∂(yt/∂ĝt)
∂λ
> 0,
∂2(∂yt/∂ĝt)
∂λ2
> 0,
∂(∂yt/∂t̂t)
∂λ
< 0,
∂2(∂yt/∂t̂t)
∂λ2
< 0 (13)
where lower case variables represent log deviations from steady state values, and hatted variables represent
deviations from steady state as a proportion of steady state output. Results presented in (12) are typical
demand conditions stating that government spending rises and tax cuts lead to increases in output. The
third condition in (12) illustrates that the aggregate demand impact of a unit change in government
spending is greater than the aggregate demand impact of a unit change in taxes, which happens for
two main reasons: first, tax movements only impact the consumption decisions of the impatient whereas
patient agents adhere to Ricardian equivalence: as λ < 1 there is a share of consumers for which a (lump
sum) tax cut is not initially impacting. Second, government spending movements directly effect demand
through direct production. The impact of tax movements on aggregate demand depend on the decisions
of households, who can use, say, a tax cut to both purchase more consumption and more leisure, the
latter of which will reduce production in the economy.9 The conditions presented in (13) state that
the impact that fiscal policy has on the aggregate economy is increasing in the proportion of impatient
agents, and is doing so in a non-linear way. The first condition is a result from Gal´ı et al. (2007), and
the second is a result from Bilbiie (2008), both of which carry forward to this model.
3.2 Calibration
The calibration of parameters applied for dynamic simulation is standard: each period represents a
quarter where βR and βNR are set at 0.99 and 0.973 respectively.10 The inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, σ, and the inverse of the elasticity of labour with respect to real wages, ϕ, are
set at 1 and 2 respectively. The capital share (α) is set at 1/3, depreciation (δ) at 0.025, price stickiness
(θ) at 0.75, the capital adjustment cost parameter (κ) at 5, and the elasticity of substitution across
intermediate goods (ǫ) at 6. The resulting calibration of the steady state share of investment in output is
0.2, and the steady state shares of consumption and government spending in output are set at 0.64 and
0.16 respectively: government debt is assumed to be zero in steady state. The Taylor rule parameters
are set such that ϕπ = 1.8, ϕy = 0.1 and ρr = 0.8; the persistence of the other shock processes are also
government spending cuts all lead to a rise in aggregate demand.
9The magnitude to which government spending increases dominate tax cuts can be algebraically shown to be inversely
proportional to the level of asset market non-participation, and positively related to the level of private consumption in
steady state and the markup charged by intermediate firms.
10Lawrance (1991) presents evidence to suggest that rates of annual time preference vary by 7% between rich and poor
households.
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set equal to 0.8, with their standard deviations set to σa = 0.007, σb = 0.004, σi = 0.001, σk = 0.001
and σσa = 0.1. Lump sum taxes are set such that the level of consumption for impatient agents in steady
state is 0.8 of that of patient household consumption, and λ, the proportion of impatient households in
the population, is set at 0.35.
The following two subsections discuss the conduct of fiscal policy whilst the economy has a negative
output gap. The impact of fiscal policy on the aggregate and disaggregate economy, with respect to
the benchmark of an acyclical fiscal response, is not sensitive to the type of shock applied and as such,
for brevity, analysis will focus on a shock to total factor productivity; sensitivity of the results to other
shocks will be discussed.
3.3 The positive consequences of fiscal policy
Figure 1 illustrates dynamic responses from a positive shock to total factor productivity to both the
aggregate and disaggregate economy under three scenarios: a benchmark of acyclical fiscal policy (ϕg =
ϕT = 0); a countercyclical ‘policy experiment 1’ (ϕg < 0, ϕb,g < 0); and a countercyclical ‘policy
experiment 2’ (ϕT > 0, ϕb,T > 0). In the presence of acyclical fiscal policy, a positive shock to total
factor productivity leads to a fall in both the output gap (as adjustment costs and stickiness in the model
lead to potential output rising faster than actual output), and also to an initial fall in actual output.
This second result does not occur in an economy populated with only patient agents (λ = 0), but does so
in this calibration as a rise in productivity leads to a fall in labour demand. This subsequently reduces
employment and disposable incomes of impatient households, and as such their consumption falls: this
fall is sufficiently large enough to cause a decrease in aggregate consumption.11
[Insert Figure 1]
This fall in consumption of credit-constrained agents is in contrast to a rise in consumption for patient
agents, who also increase their level of investment (as capital becomes more productive) and decrease
their level of employment (as a result of lower labour demand). Taken together, patient households both
consume more and work less in response to the shock with acyclical fiscal policy, compared to both the
steady state and to impatient households, which happens for two main reasons: first, patient households’
consumption is determined by the level of real interest rates which fall as a result of the negative output
gap and falling inflation; and second, with a zero-borrowing-constraint impatient consumers can only
use their labour supply in order to insulate themselves from exogenous shocks. In the presence of
falling disposable income, credit-constrained agents increase their labour supply in order to increase
their consumption.
11Note that throughout the lifetime of the experiments in Fig. 1, the net real interest rate is never large enough to induce
impatient households to save.
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The impact of fiscal policy in both experiments is to increase output in the short run, above the
benchmark of acyclical policy, as there is greater demand in the economy. In policy experiment 1, where
government spending increases in the short run are funded by future spending cuts, this increase in
demand comes directly from the government; in policy experiment 2, the increase in demand derives
from impatient agents’ consumption as their disposable income increases in the presence of short term
tax cuts. In both examples, the impact on the disaggregate economy is consistent: the consumption
of impatient agents rises and the consumption of patient agents falls in the short run, compared to the
benchmark of acyclical fiscal policy.
Through countercyclical fiscal policy, the government is insulating the economy from the shock, and,
as such, is removing the costs associated with impatient households’ lack of engagement with credit
markets. Increased demand within the economy increases real wages and credit-constrained agents are
therefore less exposed to shocks. Patient agents, on the other hand, substitute leisure for consumption
as the increase in labour demand increases their employment levels: they optimise by reducing consump-
tion. Real interest rates are higher compared to a benchmark of acyclical policy, which further suppresses
patient agents’ consumption and increases their employment. In policy experiment 2, impatient house-
holds use some of the tax cut to buy more leisure and optimise by reducing their levels of employment
below the acyclical benchmark: in policy experiment 1, labour demand is increased and these agents
respond to higher wages.
Over the short run, output in policy experiment 1 dominates that from policy experiment 2 which
reconciles with (12). Over the medium run, the path of output in the acylclical policy benchmark
dominates output under the two policy experiments, as fiscal actions contract the economy as debt is
repaid. This has the impact of reversing the disaggregate effects discussed above, but only mildly, as
debt is repaid over a long time horizon.
3.4 The normative consequences of fiscal policy
The normative consequences of fiscal policy are now investigated by evaluating the different agent’s
welfare under the policy experiments discussed above. In order to control for the difference in discount
factors between the patient and impatient households, welfare (W i) is written in a Cobb-Douglas form
evaluating instantaneous utility (U it ) and future movements in welfare such that:
W it =
(
1− βi
)
U it + β
iEtW
i
t+1 (14)
Note that under the scenarios described above, where there is one initial shock followed by different fiscal
experiments, this welfare criterion reduces to the sum of discounted utility for each household normalised
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by (1 − βi). This normalisation ensures that more patient households are not perceived to gain more
welfare simply through discounting future utility by less; this normalisation is important in order to
evaluate the relative movements in welfare across households. A constant elasticity of substitution social
welfare function is also applied:
Wt =
[
λ
(
WNRt
)−γ
+ (1− λ)
(
WRt
)−γ]− 1γ
(15)
where if γ = −1 provides a utilitarian welfare function, γ > −1 represents inequality aversion, and as
γ →∞ a Rawlsian social welfare function is produced.
Figure 2 presents welfare valuations of the two policy experiments when the economy is struck by
the same total factor productivity shock discussed above for varying values of the cyclical-response
parameters (ϕg, ϕT : the top row), and varying values of the debt response parameters (ϕb,g, ϕb,T : the
bottom row). The vertical line in the top row represents acyclical policy (ϕg = ϕT = 0), where it is
observed that the welfare of patient agents dominates that of the impatient as a result of the total factor
productivity shock. The gain in welfare of patient agents is due to their rise in consumption and fall in
employment, and is larger than in an economy populated fully by patient agents, due to the insulating
presence of impatient households; credit-constrained agents respond to falling incomes through increasing
their labour supply, which both decreases real wages and increases production in the economy. This leads
to a redistribution of welfare from workers to capital holders, as lower wages lead to higher profits, which
subsequently leads to contrasting welfare implications from exogenous shocks in the model.
[Insert figure 2]
From this acyclical benchmark, Fig. 2 presents four clear results on the heterogeneous impacts of
fiscal policy. First, impatient households gain welfare and patient households lose welfare as a result of
countercyclical policy; this reconciles with the dynamics presented above. It is observed that the more
countercyclical the response, the greater the gains and losses of welfare from the benchmark of acyclical
policy. Through insulating the economy, the government is also reducing the response of the impatient
agents to increase their labour supply, which is the source of the redistribution from workers to capital
holders. As demonstrated in the fourth column of Fig. 1, this is most pronounced over a shorter time
period, where movements in utility are most affected by the policy response: as debt is repaid, the welfare
impacts are dampened. This results in impatient agents deriving all their benefit from policy upfront,
whereas the patient gain as the policy matures. This is significant because the polarizing nature of fiscal
policy is stronger over a shorter political time horizon compared with a lifetime perspective.
Second, quicker repayment of debt resulting from countercyclical fiscal actions leads to lower move-
ments in relative welfare as a result of policy (the second row in Fig. 2). This occurs because the initial
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impact of the intervention is shortened as the repayment of the policy is accelerated in the economy.
Third, impatient agents benefit more from policy experiment 2 as the tax cuts provide them with the
most freedom to optimise their utility, especially in the short term (as demonstrated in Fig. 1), which
they do by both consuming more and working less.12 Patient households are also seen to lose less as a
result of tax cuts, compared to spending increases, due to comparatively lower labour demand requiring
less work from these agents. A normative assessment would therefore favour policy experiment 2, which
is in contrast to the conclusions based on output movements; policy experiment 1 provides more output
stabilisation (as demonstrated in (12) and Fig. 1), which provides a different trade-off for policy makers.
Finally, average welfare movements from policy are small, which is coherent with Lucas (2003). The
normative justification for fiscal policy comes from its redistributional consequences, as it reduces the
divergent experiences across the two agents as a result of the shock. In policy experiment 2, mild
improvements in social welfare are observed with a utilitarian function, whereas in policy experiment 1
inequality aversion is required to see an improvement in social welfare (γ ≥ 3.4; the third column of Fig.
2). The result that average welfare changes as a response of fiscal intervention are negligible leads to the
polarization across agents in the model: as one agent gains welfare from policy, the other agent loses.
3.4.1 Other shock processes
The same analysis as presented in Figs. 1 and 2 can be performed for when the initial shock originates
from any of the other exogenous processes. The redistribution of welfare, in the presence of the shock
and acyclical fiscal policy, from impatient to patient households is observed whereby the former agents’
labour market decisions (due to the lack of participation in capital markets) improves welfare for the
latter agents over an economy populated only by the patient. As other shocks have limited impact on
potential output, the acyclical welfare results become more polarizing with the losses of impatient agents
being mirrored by the gains of the patient, as utility is transferred from workers to capital holders. From
this benchmark, fiscal policy interacts with the economy in a similar way to those presented above, and
the disaggregated welfare experiences of the two households also follow similar paths.
3.5 The conduct of fiscal policy over the business cycle
The above analysis was performed considering only shocks resulting in a negative output gap in order to
focus on the recent economic environment. If we were to consider periods of a positive output gap, the
intuition from above would be reversed: countercyclical fiscal policy would temper demand within the
economy resulting in lower labour demand and wages, compared to an acyclical benchmark. To obtain
12Note that when considering the dynamics of instantaneous utility (as opposed to welfare over the whole fiscal experi-
ment) the assumption of whether government expenditure enters the utility function is no longer trivial in policy experiment
1. The plots in Fig. 1 assume that government consumption does not enter the utility function.
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more general results, the conduct of fiscal policy over the business cycle is considered where the cyclical
response parameters are varied and set equal to each other in absolute terms (−ϕg = ϕT ). The results
are not sensitive to this policy and as such this approach is adopted for brevity. Stochastic simulations
are run, using the calibration of shocks as outlined in Section 3.2, with key statistics documented in Fig.
3.
[Insert Figure 3]
A countercyclical fiscal response leads to higher average levels of utility for impatient households and
lower average levels for patient households, compared to the benchmark of acyclical policy. In the ab-
sence of engagement with credit markets, impatient households are more exposed to business cycles and
as such have the most to gain from policy removing these cycles.13 Capital holders, on the other hand,
benefit from volatility as it generates labour supply movements from the credit-constrained agents, which
are more insulating for patient households than government intervention.14 This occurs because whereas
countercyclical fiscal policy impacts the aggregate economy in a non-discriminating way, the insulating
effect of credit-constrained households is redistributing from workers to capital holders. As is demon-
strated from the second pane in Fig. 3, the improvements in the variance of consumption for impatient
households from countercyclical policy are large in comparison to the slight rise for patient households.
From a social welfare perspective, weighted average movements as a result of policy are minimal (as
presented in Fig. 3), and a high degree of inequality aversion is required in order for improvements to
occur monotonically with more countercyclical policy.15
However, this is a stylised economy with stylised policy. If imperfectly competitive labour markets
were included which prohibited both households supplying labour independently of one another, the
returns to countercyclical policy would be greater, and more so were wages to be sticky. Moreover, if the
share of impatient households were to increase, greater social gains would be seen from fiscal intervention.
Policies focusing on changing lump sum taxes have a bigger impact on credit-constrained agents as they
directly influence their disposable income.
Polarizing preferences over the conduct of fiscal policy are again observed and these results are of
particular significance because they contribute to the literature which finds fiscal policy to be frequently
procyclical, especially in developing nations, see for example Woo (2009). This can be reconciled to our
13Throughout the lifetime of the simulation, the real interest rate is never sufficient to induce impatient households to
want to save, at any calibration of fiscal parameters.
14Trivially, at very high values of −ϕg and ϕT the business cycle is virtually removed as agents expect the government
response to movements away from flexible output to be strong. If such a policy is credible and possible, this would be
optimal for both types of agent.
15As patient households are the majority of the population, a social planner with low γ optimises with procyclical policy
as patient agents benefit from this. At values of γ > 20, countercyclical policy becomes optimal for the inequality-averse
planner, using the calibrations in the above experiment. Allowing more flexibility, impatient agents prefer policy focusing on
tax movements as these directly contribute to disposable income; patient agents, on the other hand, prefer countercyclical
policy focusing on government spending, and the social planner compromises with more of the latter.
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model by observing that the results above are amplified the higher the proportion of credit-constrained
agents, see (13) and Section 4.3, and therefore the returns to procyclical policy for patient households
are greater in such economies. Empirical data illustrates that the proportion of credit-constrained agents
is greater in developing countries, see for example Evans and Karras (1996), and that voter turnout in
both parliamentary and presidential elections are lower in these countries.16 Providing sufficient voting
power is retained in the remaining patient households of a nation, the model would predict the empirical
regularity that these developing countries are more fiscally procyclical, as they provide more insulation
for the capital owners within the economy.
4 Further extensions and sensitivity analysis
4.1 Distortionary taxation
The above analysis has been performed using lump sum taxation, however, using distortionary taxes
provides similar results. From the structure of the model it is possible to include taxes on wages, capital
income, consumption, and employment by firms.17 If these distortionary taxes are included in the model
and experiments performed in line with those above, similar results prevail: countercyclical policy is
to the advantage of impatient households and at the expense of patient households. Consumption and
labour income taxes are more effective at redistributing welfare, compared to employer social security
contributions and capital income taxes, as the latter two accrue to patient households who can smooth
the impact of the policy. However, a countercyclical response of these taxes leads to an incentive to
increase employment, and subsequently a stabilisation of the economy.
Simulations performed over the course of a business cycle provide similar results to those presented
above: countercyclical policy focusing on any combination of distortionary taxes, but especially on
consumption and income taxes, is to the benefit of impatient agents whereas patient households prefer
procyclical policy. The result that those agents who are most exposed to business cycles gain from policy
which stabilises these is maintained. Moreover, the concept that, in the presence of acyclical policy,
credit-constrained agents insulate patient households through their labour market transactions is also
16Evans and Karras (1996) estimate the proportion of credit-constrained agents in 54 different countries, and applying
World Bank classifications the mean estimate for developing countries is nearly double that of developed countries. More-
over, applying the same World Bank classifications to voter turnout data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, rates of 78% are found for developed economies followed by a monotonic decline with the level of development
with rates of 65% for low income countries. Studies into the socio-economic factors influencing voter turnout frequently
show that it is those with less education and less income who are less likely to vote (see for example Nevitte et al., 2009):
those individuals most likely not to participate in capital markets.
17Taxes on consumption (τct ) and wages (τ
l
t) enter such that the price paid on consumption and the income earned on
labour are (1 + τct )Pt and (1 − τ
l
t)Wt, respectively. In production, employers pay social security contributions (τ
er
t ) and
patient households pay a tax on their capital income (τkt ) such that the total cost of labour is (1+ τ
er)Wt and the returns
on capital are (1− τkt )R
k
tKt. All tax rates are assumed to respond to both the business cycle and the level of debt, as in
(9).
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maintained.
What distortionary taxation does provide is further scope for politics to interact with the economy
and influence decisions, and it allows for more polarizing combinations of policies. For example, a policy
which cuts consumption taxes today and raises capital taxes in the future is seen to benefit impatient
households at the expense of patient households, with the opposite result from the opposite policy. As
distortionary taxes are explicitly redistributive they distort the political discussion about policy. From
the perspective of those agents most vulnerable to business cycles, the most important characteristic of
policy is that it is countercyclical.
4.2 Fiscal policy at the monetary zero lower bound
A characteristic that has been prevalent in the recent recession, and which has received much academic
attention, is that monetary policy has been operating at its lower bound: where nominal interest rates
reach, or are close to, zero. Under such a scenario fiscal multipliers are shown to increase as the de-
flationary impact of higher interest rates associated with higher levels of output are removed (see for
example Christiano et al. (2011)). If the above analysis is performed with monetary policy at its lower
bound, the results are strengthened. In the presence of acyclical policy there is an amplification of the
impact of the shock as the stabilising property of monetary policy is diminished: this leads to an am-
plification in the welfare consequences resulting from the shock. From this benchmark, fiscal policy has
more scope to rebalance this larger redistribution of welfare; as above, the weighted average movements
from policy are not large (although are larger), and as such any improvements for impatient households
from countercyclical policy are at the expense of patient households.
4.3 Sensitivity
If the model were adapted to include imperfectly competitive labour markets similar to those in Gal´ı
et al. (2007), where a continuum of trade unions bargain to add a markup on wages by aggregating indi-
vidual preferences to create a weighted average labour supply function, the results remain qualitatively
unchanged as those presented above. There is a redistribution of welfare observed in the presence of
an exogenous shock and this can be reduced through countercyclical fiscal measures. The quantitative
results are amplified, with the losses of impatient agents being increased from shocks leading to a neg-
ative output gap, and the scope of fiscal policy is therefore extended by this additional rigidity in the
market.18 Although it is the labour market response of impatient households which drives the redis-
tribution from exogenous shocks, perfect labour markets provide these agents with the most flexibility
18Similar results can be derived if it is assumed that the two types of agent’s labour are imperfect substitutes of each
other.
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with which to minimise their losses. With imperfectly competitive labour markets, there is still a desire
to increase their labour supply in response to a fall in disposable income, and trade unions incorporate
this preference in their negotiations resulting in a fall in real wages. This subsequently maintains the
redistribution of welfare to capital owners.
The greater the share of impatient households, λ, the greater the impact of any initial shock (as
the economy is more exposed to movements in labour demand) and the greater the impact fiscal policy
has on aggregate demand within the economy (as demonstrated in (13)). Moreover, the greater the
population of credit-contained agents, the fewer remaining patient households there are to benefit from
the redistributional impact of business cycles. These relationships act to increase the above results
at higher values of λ, however both the qualitative and quantitative results are retained at reasonable
calibrations.
Price stickiness in the model also tends to increase both the impact of shocks and the scope for
fiscal policy to interact within the economy, therefore, higher calibrated values of θ amplify the above
results. If stickiness in the model were removed altogether, there would be a role for countercyclical
fiscal policy to aid those most exposed to business cycles due to the presence of other rigidities in the
economy. However, with price flexibility, the costs associated with not having access to capital markets
diminish. Moreover, the effectiveness of fiscal policy also diminishes as the removal of rigidities leads to
smaller fiscal multipliers. At all reasonable calibrations of θ, the results above are both qualitatively and
quantitatively maintained.
5 Conclusions
The results from the paper suggest that preferences across agents over the conduct of fiscal policy are
polarized, which subsequently predicts strong debates over appropriate policy measures, something fre-
quently observed. The intuition behind these results is clear: those agents who have limited access to
credit markets to smooth their consumption are the most exposed to fluctuations caused by business
cycles, and therefore have the most to gain from measures which promote stability. In the presence
of falling incomes, these agents insulate themselves through increasing their labour supply, which sup-
presses real wages, and therefore transfers income and utility from workers to capital holders. From
the perspective of patient agents, these labour market transactions provide more insulation than non-
discriminating government policy. Over the course of the business cycle, credit-constrained agents see
welfare improvements through the adoption of countercyclical fiscal policy, whereas patient households
benefit more from the volatility caused by procyclical policies. These results are amplified the higher
the level of credit market non-participation, and therefore the returns from procyclical policy to patient
16
agents are increased within these economies. This contributes to the literature which finds fiscal policy
to be procyclical, especially in developing economies, as it is these countries which have higher levels of
credit market non-participation.
In effect, these fiscal decisions are played in a near zero-sum game where the gains of one household
are netted off against the losses of the other, and this is the source of the polarizing preferences across
agents in the model. These polarized effects are consistent with those observed in the real world, and
come from a model which assumes away progressive taxes and which possesses modest multipliers. The
normative justification for fiscal policy is present, therefore, despite its relatively modest impact on
output.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the editor, Antoni Chawluk, and and two anonymous referees whose comments greatly
helped to improve the paper. I am also grateful for the comments from Gulcin Ozkan, Neil Rankin and
participants at Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, April 2013.
Funding
Economic and Social Research Council (award number: ES/H011528/1).
References
Bilbiie, F. (2008). Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) aggregate demand
logic, Journal of Economic Theory 140: 162–196.
Calvo, G. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework, Journal of Monetary Economics
12: 383–398.
Carroll, C. D. (2000). Requiem for the representative consumer? Aggregate implications of microeco-
nomic consumption behavior, American Economic Review 90: 110–115.
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M. and Rebelo, S. (2011). When is the government spending multiplier
large?, Journal of Political Economy 119: 78–121.
Evans, P. and Karras, G. (1996). Private and government consumption with liquidity constraints, Journal
of International Money and Finance 15: 255–266.
17
Gal´ı, J., Lo´pez-Salido, J. and Valle´s, J. (2007). Understanding the effects of government spending on
consumption, Journal of the European Economic Association 5: 227–270.
Krusell, P., Mukoyama, T., Sahin, A. and Smith Jr, A. (2009). Revisiting the welfare effects of eliminating
business cycles, Review of Economic Dynamics 12: 393–404.
Krusell, P. and Smith, A. (1999). On the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles, Review of Economic
Dynamics 2: 245–272.
Lawrance, E. C. (1991). Poverty and the rate of time preference: Evidence from panel data, Journal of
Political Economy 99: 54–77.
Lucas, R. (2003). Macroeconomic priorities, American Economic Review 93: 1–14.
Mankiw, N. (2000). The savers-spenders theory of fiscal policy, American Economic Review 90: 120–125.
Mukoyama, T. and S¸ahin, A. (2006). Costs of business cycles for unskilled workers, Journal of Monetary
Economics 53: 2179–2193.
Nevitte, N., Blais, A., Gidengil, E. and Nadeau, R. (2009). Socio-economic status and non-voting, In:
Klingemann, H. ed. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Oxford University Press, Oxford: 85–
108.
Wolfers, J. (2003). Is business cycle volatility costly? Evidence from surveys of subjective well-being,
International Finance 6: 1–26.
Woo, J. (2009). Why do more polarized countries run more procyclical fiscal policy?, The Review of
Economics and Statistics 91: 850–870.
18
Appendix: derivation of algebraic results performed on a log-
linear version of the model
If the model abstracts from capital formation and log-linear conditions are taken, it is possible to condense
the model into an aggregate demand condition, a New-Keynesian Phillips curve, and monetary and fiscal
rules. The aggregate demand relationship can be obtained by combining the log-linear versions of the
goods market clearing condition (11), the production function (6), and the Euler equation obtained
through combining the optimisation of the patient and impatient households utility:19
yt = Et {yt+1} − ΦEt {△ĝt+1} − ΦΘA
(
rt − Et {πt+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
})
+ΦΘBEt
{
∆εat+1
}
+ΦΘCEt
{
△t̂NRt+1
}
(16)
Φ =
Γ−1
Γ−1 − γc [ϕλ (1 + ϕ)]
ΘA = γc (1− λ)
1
σ
(ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ (1− α)) Γ
ΘB = γcϕλ(1 + ϕ)Γ
ΘC = γcϕλ(1 + µ)Γ
Γ = [ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ (1− α) [1− λ (1 + ϕ)]]
−1
where γc is the steady state share of private consumption to output (C/Y ). From this relationship the
conditions presented in (12) and (13) can be derived.
Providing Φ, ΘA, ΘB , ΘC and Γ are positive the aggregate demand condition provides the expected
relationships; increases in government spending and reductions in taxes and interest rates lead to increases
in aggregate demand. However, it is possible to observe from the definition of Φ that this is not always
the case. There exists a bound on the proportion of impatient households, λ, such that above this limit
(notated as λ∗), the traditional demand relationships are reversed. Bilbiie (2008) refers to this as the
region of ‘inverted Keynesian logic’. From the derivation of the aggregate demand condition it is possible
to show this limit in the benchmark economy is:
λ∗ =
ϕγc(1 + µ) + σ(1− α)
(1 + ϕ) [ϕγc + σ(1− α)]
19Specifically, the log-linear consumption function of impatient households is combined with the patient household’s
Euler equation to obtain dynamics of aggregate consumption. The resulting equation is a function of future consumption,
employment, and wages where the latter two can be substituted using the production function and an aggregate labour
supply function, respectively.
19
Fig. 1 Dynamics under different fiscal experiments
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Dynamics achieved through a third-order approximation of the the model using the calibration described in Section 3.1 and
with a one standard deviation shock to total factor productivity. The x-axis represents the number of quarters and the y-axis
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Fig. 2 Welfare consequences of policy experiments
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Fig. 3 Fiscal policy and welfare through the business cycle
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Stochastic simulation achieved through a third-order approximation of the model using the calibration described in Section
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